Abstract
We model how investors allocate between asset managers, managers choose portfolios of multiple securities, fees are set, and security prices are determined. Investors are indifferent between higher-cost informed managers and lower-cost uninformed managers, interpreted as passive managers as their portfolio is linked to the " expected market portfolio." We make precise Samuelson's dictum by showing that active investors reduce micro-inefficiencies more than they do macro-inefficiencies. In fact, all inefficiency arises from systematic factors when the number of assets is large. Further, we show how the costs of active and passive investing affect macro- and micro-efficiency, fees, and assets managed by active and passive managers. Our findings help explain the rise of delegated asset management and the resultant changes in financial markets.
Original language | English |
---|---|
Journal | The Review of Asset Pricing Studies |
Volume | 12 |
Issue number | 2 |
Pages (from-to) | 389-446 |
Number of pages | 58 |
ISSN | 2045-9920 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Jun 2022 |
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10.1093/rapstu/raab020Licence: CC BY
Heje-Pedersen-Active-and-Passive-Investing-PublishersVersionFinal published version, 750 KBLicence: CC BY
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Gârleanu , N. (2022). Active and Passive Investing: Understanding Samuelson’s Dictum. The Review of Asset Pricing Studies, 12(2), 389-446. https://doi.org/10.1093/rapstu/raab020
Gârleanu , Nicolae ; Pedersen, Lasse Heje. / Active and Passive Investing : Understanding Samuelson’s Dictum. In: The Review of Asset Pricing Studies. 2022 ; Vol. 12, No. 2. pp. 389-446.
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title = "Active and Passive Investing: Understanding Samuelson{\textquoteright}s Dictum",
abstract = "We model how investors allocate between asset managers, managers choose portfolios of multiple securities, fees are set, and security prices are determined. Investors are indifferent between higher-cost informed managers and lower-cost uninformed managers, interpreted as passive managers as their portfolio is linked to the {"} expected market portfolio.{"} We make precise Samuelson's dictum by showing that active investors reduce micro-inefficiencies more than they do macro-inefficiencies. In fact, all inefficiency arises from systematic factors when the number of assets is large. Further, we show how the costs of active and passive investing affect macro- and micro-efficiency, fees, and assets managed by active and passive managers. Our findings help explain the rise of delegated asset management and the resultant changes in financial markets.",
author = "Nicolae G{\^a}rleanu and Pedersen, {Lasse Heje}",
year = "2022",
month = jun,
doi = "10.1093/rapstu/raab020",
language = "English",
volume = "12",
pages = "389--446",
journal = "The Review of Asset Pricing Studies",
issn = "2045-9920",
publisher = "Oxford University Press",
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}
Gârleanu , N 2022, 'Active and Passive Investing: Understanding Samuelson’s Dictum', The Review of Asset Pricing Studies, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 389-446. https://doi.org/10.1093/rapstu/raab020
Active and Passive Investing: Understanding Samuelson’s Dictum. / Gârleanu , Nicolae; Pedersen, Lasse Heje.
In: The Review of Asset Pricing Studies, Vol. 12, No. 2, 06.2022, p. 389-446.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review
TY - JOUR
T1 - Active and Passive Investing
T2 - Understanding Samuelson’s Dictum
AU - Gârleanu , Nicolae
AU - Pedersen, Lasse Heje
PY - 2022/6
Y1 - 2022/6
N2 - We model how investors allocate between asset managers, managers choose portfolios of multiple securities, fees are set, and security prices are determined. Investors are indifferent between higher-cost informed managers and lower-cost uninformed managers, interpreted as passive managers as their portfolio is linked to the " expected market portfolio." We make precise Samuelson's dictum by showing that active investors reduce micro-inefficiencies more than they do macro-inefficiencies. In fact, all inefficiency arises from systematic factors when the number of assets is large. Further, we show how the costs of active and passive investing affect macro- and micro-efficiency, fees, and assets managed by active and passive managers. Our findings help explain the rise of delegated asset management and the resultant changes in financial markets.
AB - We model how investors allocate between asset managers, managers choose portfolios of multiple securities, fees are set, and security prices are determined. Investors are indifferent between higher-cost informed managers and lower-cost uninformed managers, interpreted as passive managers as their portfolio is linked to the " expected market portfolio." We make precise Samuelson's dictum by showing that active investors reduce micro-inefficiencies more than they do macro-inefficiencies. In fact, all inefficiency arises from systematic factors when the number of assets is large. Further, we show how the costs of active and passive investing affect macro- and micro-efficiency, fees, and assets managed by active and passive managers. Our findings help explain the rise of delegated asset management and the resultant changes in financial markets.
U2 - 10.1093/rapstu/raab020
DO - 10.1093/rapstu/raab020
M3 - Journal article
SN - 2045-9920
VL - 12
SP - 389
EP - 446
JO - The Review of Asset Pricing Studies
JF - The Review of Asset Pricing Studies
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Gârleanu N, Pedersen LH. Active and Passive Investing: Understanding Samuelson’s Dictum. The Review of Asset Pricing Studies. 2022 Jun;12(2):389-446. doi: 10.1093/rapstu/raab020